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Outline
 Vendor Lock – What is it?
 Vendor Lock – What’s the problem? 
 Avoiding Vendor Lock
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What is Vendor Lock?
 “Vendor lock” - customers depend on a single manufacturer or 
supplier for some product (i.e., a good or service), and cannot 
shift to another vendor without incurring substantial costs or 
inconvenience
– Grants the vendor what amounts to monopoly power 
– Frees vendors to establish noncompetitive prices 
– Allows vendor to become the “sole source” of a given product or 
service
 May be offset by savings 
– Reduced production costs from shorter learning curves
– Development costs absorbed by vendor in a large business base
– Investment costs for commercial technologies and derivative 
product lines that benefit military products
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Levels of Vendor Lock
 Product/service (cable, phone, internet)
– IT Platform lock-in
 Technology (rockets, launchers)
– ULA versus Space-X 
 Industry (airline)
– Mergers impact prices and fees  
 Major Defense Systems 
– Little change in Top 5 Contractors 
- Devices, applications, 
internet services are 
“inconvenient” to use on 
other platforms
US Airways/AmWest merge in 2005 
Delta acquired Northwest in 2008 
United and Continental merged in 2010 
Southwest acquired Air Tran in 2011
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What is the Problem?
 Most Military Service programs award development and 
production contracts to a single prime vendor or contract team
 Vendors act differently in a vendor lock situation
 Government has little leverage to control costs and manage 
performance in a vendor lock scenario
2010 data
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Research Shows…
 Proprietary intellectual property (IP) rights restrictions may 
result from technical data and standards controlled by vendor 
– Open Systems Architecture Contract Guidebook for Program Managers, OSD 
Ver 1.1. June 2013. App 10, Breaking Vendor Lock – strategies and tools 
– Air Force Technical Data and Computer Software Rights Handbook for 
Acquisition Professionals, March 2014 - value of owning technical data rights
 Lack of Competition can increase costs and schedule  
– GAO report 2012 -Defense weapons 
systems experienced a 38 percent cost 
growth from original estimates and 
a 27-month schedule overrun   
- Government Business Council and 
Booz Allen Hamilton, Bridging the 
Disconnect, Insight Report, March 
2014 - Lack of ownership of key 
assets, and vendor lock-in or sole 
source drive acquisition problems 
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Gaining Leverage over Vendor Lock 
Avoid Vendor Lock 
 Examine Intellectual Property Rights 
– Conduct an audit of IP and rights 
– Assess Government  needs  
– Transition proprietary interfaces to 
standards
– Review Contract Data Requirements 
 Apply Competition Strategies 
– Consider dual sourcing strategies 
– Consider Competitive Multi-Sourcing
 Explore Shared Technology
– Examine investments in technology 
across vendor product lines
 Use Alternative Production Quantities
 Apply Test and Evaluation Strategies 
– Continued design and production test 
Minimize Effects of Vendor Lock
 Adopt Common Architecture
– Develop common architecture across 
product lines
– Negotiate new priced line items under 
a sole source modification
 Explore Common Product Lines 
– Review specifications for 
commonality and shared technology
– Look for production efficiencies
 Manage Subcontractor, Supplier, and 
Make-or-Buy Decisions
– Compete subsystems or components
– Scrutinize make-or-buy decisions 
– Reduce supplier product variations
 Establish a Collaboration Forum 
| 8 |
© 2014 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.  
Intellectual Property Assessment
 New DoD IP Rights Rule  
– DoD may challenge restrictions placed on the IP by the vendor 
 Tools
– Open Source Software Scanner (OSSS) - determine if software includes open 
source code that may provide Government with IP rights at no additional cost
– Key Open Subsystems Tool (KOSS) - evaluate which system components most 
susceptible to vendor lock because of proprietary interfaces (Naval Air Systems 
Command, Patuxent River, MD; Public Release SPR-09-674, 5 Aug 2009)
 Independent Assessment
– Defense Contract Management Agency (shared product data)
– Defense Contract Audit Agency (IR&D investment financial data)
 OSD OSA Guidebook Strategies
– Establish IP ownership  and apply standards 
Under the new “Major Systems Rule,” … the prime contractor or subcontractor must provide 
evidence to demonstrate it was actually developed at private expense or the contracting officer’s 
‘challenge’ will be sustained. It effectively reverses the pre-existing presumption that contractors 
and subcontractors developed commercial items at their own private expense Jun 2011
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Continuous Competition Strategies 
 Competitive Dual Sources - Two sources continuously drive down prices 
while competing for production over the life of the system   
– Greatest upfront investment by Government; creates the most competition  
 Percentage-based Distributions - Vendor A receives majority of funding 
as primary; Vendor B receives smaller percentage to partially develop its design
– This strategy keeps a second viable source in play during all phases to provide 
competitive pressure to motivate the primary contractor 
 Full Development with Scaled Production - Government selects one 
vendor for full-scale production; awards  second source for limited production 
– This strategy is best to minimize risk during production phase of the program
 Next Increment Prototype Model - Primary vendor builds current 
production unit. Second vendor builds a prototype for the next program 
increment and is positioned to compete for the next program increment 
 Partial Contractor-funded Development Model - Partial development 
funding to second vendor who can fully fund their design; potential to recapture 
development costs if the Government selects them for follow-on production
Source: Defense ARJ, Issue 65, April 2013, Continuous Competition as an Approach to Maximize Performance  
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Evaluate Test and Evaluation Strategies
 Testing and design problems can impact performance    
– Nunn-McCurdy Breaches - DoD has canceled entire programs for cost overruns 
due to design problems after investing billions of dollars
– GAO - 50 of 74 breaches involved design issues discovered after production start
– Defense Office of Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA) 
Report - root cause analysis of cost drivers, especially in performance management
 Test and Evaluation should be exploited to improve outcomes
– Early involvement by Test and Evaluation (T&E) experts - Prove the design and 
sustainment concepts through demonstration and test
– Develop a common test environment - End-user suitable as well as supportable.  
Cyber upgrades and software fixes need to be easily accommodated   
– Establish IP rights for test data - IP rights should extend to the development and 
test environment where vendors may lay the groundwork for system changes  
PARCA 2013 Report: Currently Dominant Root Causes 
• Poor systems engineering to translate user requirements into testable specifications  
• Ineffective use of contractual incentives - acquisition strategy satisfies conditions for success
• Poor risk management - evaluation, and mitigation of risks
• Poor situational awareness - related to the cost, schedule, and technical performance  
| 11 |
© 2014 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.  
 Phases as depicted are mapped to milestones and design reviews
– Programs have latitude on timing of Phases
– Phases should be iterative as system matures
 Build in “fix-it” intervals, shift “vulnerability discovery” earlier in life cycle
 Interim DoDI 5000.02, 26 Nov 2013 - New/better guidance for testing of IT
 Defense Acquisition Guidebook Chapter 9 - DASD DT&E and OSD DOT&E 
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Subcontractor, Supplier, Make or Buy 
 Obtain full market research data from the Prime under 
FAR Part 10 to maximize access to other suppliers
– Prime vendor develops a market analysis with a minimum of three 
alternatives: make, buy, or hybrid buy with multiple suppliers 
– Prime vendor develops a basis of estimate (BOE) that supports the technical 
approach to make or buy; substantiate BOE with plans for efficiencies 
 Utilize contract clauses such as value engineering or award fee 
incentives to encourage proposals for supplier efficiencies 
 Engage supply chain vendors for production line efficiencies
 Leveraging Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) to 
introduce new players in technology
FAR 48.101 Value Engineering - Contractors may suggest or be required to propose 
methods for performing more economically. Value engineering attempts to eliminate, 
…anything that increases acquisition, operation, or support costs.
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Underutilized Resources
 Defense Contract Management Agency
– Leverage Vendor Knowledge  
– Quality system reviews, test and inspect 
 Defense Contract Audit Agency
– Access to IR&D, IP investment financial data 
– Conduct special audits 
 Suppliers
– Parts standardization opportunities
– Additional sources 
 Contracting Officers
– Utilize contracting provisions in their tool kit (VECP)
 R&D Entities 
– Tap into DARPA, SBIR, STTR Programs for additional sources 
DCMA Corporate ACO has 
extensive data on the Prime to 
conduct a review of product lines 
across multiple customers    
What happened to those 
suppliers on the competing 
contractor’s team that didn’t win 
the production contract?  They 
could  be a source of supply  
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Recommendations
 Analyze the true ownership and value of IP 
– Appendix 10 OSA Contract Guidebook strategies  
 Consider competitive production strategies  
– Dual source production, leader-follower, low-level production 
quantity, targeted technology development second source  
 Minimize variables and design problems  
– Redundancy, shared technology, commercial variants
– Standardize component and spare parts specifications
– Make T&E an interactive process in the life cycle  
 Renegotiate prices for continued efficiencies  
– IP ownership, technical data reuse, component and supplier 
parts competitions, quantity discounts
– Utilize contract clauses (VECP, award fee, post-award audits) 
 Collaborate to avoid and mitigate vendor lock
– Break down Military Service and Program Stovepipes
Actions:
• Collaborate with 
DCMA/DCAA to  
use vendor data
• Own IP assets 
• Leverage shared 
technology
• Utilize Contract 
provisions to 
continually pursue 
efficiencies 
